

TACTICS

Vol. 3, No. 5

May 20, 1966

Publisher and Editor: Edward Hunter

320 North George Mason Drive

Arlington, Virginia 22203

© Copyright 1966 by Edward Hunter

Second-class postage paid at Arlington, Va.

GOT HIS JOBS MIXED

By James Reston in N. Y. Times, April 22, 1966

"...the private McNamara is quite different from the public McNamara. He is not a computer but a philosopher. He is probably more interested in disarmament than any other Secretary of Defense in the world today... He is supposed to be a pragmatist, but he is an incorrigible idealist."

McNamara As Sec. of Disarmament

U.S. DEFENSE SECONDARY

By EDWARD HUNTER

The time has come for a documented, analytical study into what makes Robert Strange McNamara tick, and how he ticks. Indeed, our Secretary of Defense was the subject of the first article in the first issue of TACTICS, entitled: "McNamara's Political Decision Sinks Nuclear Ship Program." This was January 20, 1964. We followed this up in our next issue, of February 20, 1964, with an article entitled: "So You Can Be Specific---McNamara's Political Decisions." We continued this on March 20, 1964.

Actually, these headlines were not precisely correct. McNamara's motivation, in our terminology, is not political, but ideological. His words and deeds do not fit into this or that political party, whether Republican or Democratic. He was a Republican at Ford, and fit comfortably into the Kennedy Democratic Administration. He is at home with the Fabian socialist breed that characterizes the present government at Washington. He is one of the self-styled "government of the elite," whose attitude toward Congress is one of impatient arrogance, considering it a necessary evil that can be news-managed, along with the press and the public. This is all supposedly for the good of the people, who cannot be trusted with knowing what is good for them. This is the McNamara approach. (They'll learn not to reject his Edsels!)

CONSIDERS HIMSELF SECRETARY OF DISARMAMENT

An insight into his thinking was provided by the Defense Department Digest of February 1, 1965. It quoted an interview with him, broadcast over television on January 4, 1965, when he said: "I think it would be a tremendous opportunity for us economically and socially to eliminate defense entirely. It would be a social good." Defense and disarmament seem to blend subtly in his mind, which probably explains some of his most vigorously supported policies that are indistinguishable from unilateral disarmament.

McNamara brought a new approach to his job. Hitherto, whoever filled the post saw it as a big enough job in itself, too important to the nation's survival to subordinate to any other task. This obviously is not McNamara's thinking. Somehow, he has missed the point that the job of the Secretary of Defense is to attend to the defense of the United States. He is not supposed to use his position for ulterior purposes, as a subordinate agency of the State Department, for example. Yet, this is how McNamara is conducting the Defense Department. Certainly to regard his job as Secretary of Defense as "a tremendous opportunity for us economically and socially to eliminate defense entirely," is to violate his oath of office. His main interest is in disarmament, not defense. Only in this setting do his actions make sense, and it is not the kind of sense that is safe for the United States.

MILITARY GAGGING HIS CHARACTERISTIC

This writer gave a number of talks in various cities during the past couple of months. One morning, as he was being driven to his next engagement, his host remarked: "I was very lucky recently to be able to see my brother, a colonel in Viet Nam. He gave me the real picture of the Viet Nameese war." "How did you happen to see him?" I asked. "He was ordered back home on a short mission, to appear before a Congressional committee, so it could obtain certain information firsthand," was the reply.

"Well!" I exclaimed. "The Senators certainly had their eyes opened. How did they react?" He had told me what his brother had said to him. We were repeating the same, old errors of the Korean War, that kept us from winning. We were implementing the same, no-win policy. We even were concealing the decisive role being taken by the Soviet Russians. But my host shook his head.

"Oh, no," he said. "He wasn't able to mention any of that at the hearing. You see, before going to it,

he was brought to the Pentagon, where he was briefed exhaustively on what to say and what not to say."

"Why didn't he tell them the truth?" I blurted out. The answer was a familiar one. "How could he? His career wouldn't have been worth a plugged nickel. He's got a family to support."

In other words, the trip home to present firsthand evidence to the Congress was a news-managed performance.

This was not the first such incident to have come to my attention. Practically everyone who has any contact with the military in Washington knows of similar cases. The Congress is beginning to show signs of being upset over the situation. Maybe, with a little encouragement and needling from voters, it will do something about it. A 1049-page publication dated February and March, 1966, has just been released, entitled: "Military Procurement Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967." It contains the texts of hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Reference to military gagging is found in this colloquy between Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) as chairman and Secretary of Defense McNamara (page 226):

The chairman. Mr. Secretary, before you begin your testimony, I wish to discuss briefly with you a memorandum written by Secretary Vance [Cyrus R., deputy secretary of defense] on January 11, 1965, which deals with Congressional appearances by Department of Defense witnesses... It is supposed to give guidance to prospective witnesses who will appear before Congressional committees, and are required to give their personal opinions... Don't you think that is a rather restrictive memorandum and that it is calculated to make a witness so reticent that this committee would not be able to get all of his personal views?

Secretary McNamara. I believe it will not lead to the result that you fear. Yes, I think this quite clearly expresses my policy... we recognize not only the right but the need of the Congress to receive a full exposure of the facts on all of these issues, and not only facts but opinions of responsible officials of the Department. Therefore, we only insist that the official, when he is testifying before the Congress as to his own opinion should (a) indicate that he has had the opportunity to present that opinion to me or to the other decision-makers in the Department, and, (b) present in addition to his own opinion, a balanced appraisal, because there are always two sides to these issues. That is what the memorandum says.

RECOGNIZED AS A McNAMARA GAGGING TACTIC

Chairman Russell. But why should you compel a man who holds a contrary view that you have decided against, and that has been overruled not only by you but by the President and other officials of the Department of Defense, to give, in addition to his own opinion, the opinions that prompted him to lose the contest?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I think that the Congress benefits by a balanced appraisal of the problems, Mr. Chairman. I tried in my statement---

Chairman Russell. We wouldn't circumscribe you in sending someone else up here to give other views, but it seems to me this is calculated to make the witness overly cautious and cause him to not present to this committee his plain unvarnished opinion. The memorandum says that where his personal views were expressed "If such be the fact to appropriate authorities within the Department of Defense before the departmental position was established." I suppose that if this committee insisted that he give his personal opinion, and he had not yet expressed his views to the Department of Defense officials, he would be barred then from giving us his personal opinion.

Secretary McNamara. Oh, no, no...

Chairman Russell. But I don't like this idea of compelling a man to argue against his own honest conclusions and opinions just because they happen to be different from those with the power of decision in the Department of Defense. I think that the committees of Congress are entitled to get a full explanation from anyone. There have been a few occasions, not many, where one member, for example, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has strongly held a dissenting opinion. I may say that those occasions are getting much less numerous here in recent years than they used to be.

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this situation is that other Congressional committees are engaged in a similar fight with different agencies of the Administration over this issue of whether they can question officials and employees of the Executive departments and be told the truth, instead of being lied to. This is

the issue in the Otto Otepka case involving the State Department, for instance.

Of course, McNamara's order is simply a sophisticated device to gag military officers in spite of laws and regulations forbidding this. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (D-Mass.) brought this out, as follows:

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Secretary, I just call your attention to the fact that chapter 5, on page 1110, section 137, title 10, of the Armed Forces, subsection (e) reads: "After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate." I would not think that that letter of Mr. Vance's was strictly in accordance with that statute, and I recall very clearly the Chief of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, testifying before this committee some years ago, where he took a direct position contrary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recall very clearly. I just wondered whether that letter of Mr. Vance's was in accordance with the section of the statute.

Secretary McNamara. I think completely so, Senator Saltonstall.

This has been the general attitude of McNamara, looking Congressmen in the eye and calling black white and white black, taking recourse in doubletalk, hairsplitting, evasion and stalling---in effect, lying.

" U N D E R C O M P U L S I O N A N D D U R E S S "

The gagging memorandum was printed in the record (page 229). It gave instructions regarding how an officer or official was to respond "if pressed for his personal opinion" by members of Congress. Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) noted this phraseology, as follows:

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, I notice you say "If pressed for his personal opinion." Will you explain to the committee just how far a Senator has to go to show he is pressing for his personal opinion?

Secretary McNamara. I think that "if asked for" would be a better way of phrasing it.

Senator Smith. "Pressed" is a pretty strong word.

Secretary McNamara. Surely. I think "asked for" would be better.

Chairman Russell. Already it is difficult enough for us to get subordinates trained to be obedient to superior command to give contrary views to us when they have them, and I didn't want to discourage them further."

Yet the official document reads "pressed" and not "asked." This is the practically invariable manner in which McNamara throws the Congress a verbal bone every once in a while, while retaining the substance.

The pressure is twofold, as shown by the written requirement that Pentagon witnesses when questioned by Congressmen give the official position, even if they oppose it, and even if they insist upon giving their own views. McNamara's pressures are exerted to hush up the existence of opposing views and force those who hold them to lie to Congress, giving the official stand as if it were their own. Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S. C.) called this "despicable" in hearings of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, as published under the title, "U. S. Army Preparedness." (See TACTICS of November 20, 1965.) The Senator returned to this subject in the appropriations hearings (page 230), as follows:

Senator Thurmond. I have had occasion to talk to a number of military people... Some of them are very high ranking colleagues. They feel they are under compulsion and duress in this matter. I had occasion to talk to one in the last few days, a rather high ranking officer, several stars, and I don't think there is any question that the public knows they are muzzled over there. They are under coercion, and I think the sooner the Secretary can relieve this, the better it is going to be for him and the Defense Department, in inspiring confidence in the Defense Department....

Secretary McNamara. I think this is a serious charge. I know of no evidence to support it. If there is evidence to support it, I think it should be presented to me.

Senator Thurmond. I am giving you the evidence now.

Secretary McNamara. You are not giving me evidence. You are giving me an unsupported statement.

Senator Thurmond. I am giving you a direct statement from a high ranking officer referring to you and to the Defense Department. If I gave his name, I think it would place him behind the so-called eight-ball, and I am not going to reveal his name, and you wouldn't expect me to, because you know you would take out some punishment on him.

Secretary McNamara. Senator Thurmond, I think those charges are entirely without foundation. I don't believe I should accept them and I don't accept them.

Senator Thurmond. You do what you please.

Secretary McNamara. May I finish my statement, please? You have made a serious charge against me and against the chairman of the Joint Chiefs [Gen. Earl G. Wheeler], and I am not prepared to accept it. You haven't presented evidence. I don't believe this committee should accept it without evidence.

Senator Thurmond. I am telling this committee what a high ranking officer has told me in the last few days.

McNAMARA'S 'ONE VOICE' IGNORES ALL OTHERS

Actually, the way the Pentagon is run, it is becoming utterly a waste of time for the Congress to call anyone to testify on military matters except McNamara, and it really is of no use questioning him, because the documentation shows that no matter what Congress says, he goes ahead and does what he wants, anyway. Others who testify are obligated to make their statements conform to his so-called "policy," irrespective of how much distortion and fabrication are required. Indeed, McNamara sets the example.

Although members of the Congress are becoming aroused over this usurpation of authority, the record shows that so long as news management and a co-conspiratorial "prestige press" can keep the details from the public, the Administration couldn't care less. The obvious duty of the voter is to obtain this information, although he cannot depend on his newspapers for it, and once having obtained it, to make sure that others know it, too, and to bring it to the attention of local editors. Mere generalizations are useless without the documentation, as provided in this article in TACTICS.

The "Report" of subcommittee no. 2, House Committee on Armed Services, dealing with "The Department of Defense Decision to Reduce the Number and Types of Manned Bombers in the Strategic Air Command," dated April 4, 1966, declares: "If the realities of the option situation are not fully revealed to Congress there is no basis for true judgment. This is the situation in which Congress all too often finds itself."

The nation is imperilled by it, for if its representatives in Congress are lied to when they ask questions, the wisest among them become unable to draft good legislation or judge correctly in foreign relations on matters concerning our literal survival. Indeed, we have two decisive cases dealing with this, those of Otepka and of McNamara. The former represents the effort to maintain the integrity of Congress, and the latter the campaign to subordinate it to the White House. In any communication or contact with any member of the Congress, whether liberal or conservative, this issue should be pressed, and the legislator be told in no uncertain terms that he will be expected to take up the cudgels in this fight on the side of the traditional, American check and balance system of Constitutional government, or he will be opposed. The same stand should be pressed upon Presidential candidates and their tickets. The time is gone when lip service can suffice. The McNamaras will give us all the lip service we ask. Truth is relative to them, judged in the Marxist manner by its support or non-support of a predetermined point of view.

McNAMARA EVEN CENSORS THE CONGRESS

McNamara is not satisfied with his gagging of the Pentagon, but employs whatever artifice he can to impose the same censorship upon the press and the Congress. The Pentagon's prerogative and duty, of course, is to censor matters of military security, such as weaponry statistics. Under our lax security procedures, the enemy has no real difficulty in obtaining practically any such information it wishes. The censorship that McNamara imposes is largely political, and actually illegal, if an issue were made of it.

An incontrovertible example is the "Report" of the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee under Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.). This document, going back to July, 1965, was sent to the Pentagon simply to have the figures knocked out of it before publication. Its contents were highly critical of McNamara, disclosing blunders and misrepresentations of direct peril to America's survival. McNamara at once stamped a "secret" label on it, making believe it concerned legitimate military secrets, thus preventing its publication. Actually, the Senate should never have permitted him to get away with such a maneuver of a political and ideological nature entirely. The publication is still kept secret, although portions have leaked out, such as details that show McNamara was really referring to paper brigades when he spoke of divisions ready for action. McNamara put on a temper tantrum when questioned about his suppression of this document on a nationwide television interview by Clark Mollenhoff, of the Cowles chain of papers.

He afterwards telephoned the White House apologizing for the scene, and as an outcome, it was decided he should take some days of rest. At the Gridiron dinner of White House correspondents, President Johnson jocularly referred to the incident, saying McNamara had been hit by a "Mollenhoff cocktail." If the impact of the truth can be compared to Molotov cocktails, the new book, "Despoilers of Democracy," by this courageous correspondent, is full of them. Mollenhoff has led a crusade within newspaper ranks against news management.

In a chapter entitled "The Department of (Self-) Defense," Mollenhoff says: "One of the biggest problems in Congressional investigations is persuading a subordinate official to come in and give truthful, though damaging, testimony about his boss." American citizens who wish to preserve a free society and do not read such books as "Despoilers of Deceit," and who do not react accordingly, are defaulting on their duties. This book by Mollenhoff is a vivid example of information being available, if our citizenry but make the effort to obtain it. (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965, 411 pages, \$5.95.)

When Congressional publications involving national security finally are published, they usually have been delayed as long as McNamara has been able to manage it, so as to lessen their impact, and wherever he can get away with it, too, he has used military secrecy as a screen behind which to delete what is unfavorable to him or his ideological, unilateral disarmament motivation.

EXAMPLE OF HIS STALLING AND EVASION

An exchange regarding our manned bomber capability, which McNamara has sought to eliminate by every possible ruse, appeared in the "Hearing" by Subcommittee No. 2, dated January and February, with Senator F. Edward Hebert (D-La.) as chairman (page 6224):

Mr. Bates [Congressman William H., R-Mass.]. I think, Dr. Foster [John S., Jr. director of Defense Research and Engineering], our concern has already been expressed here time and time again, and the fact that you want to look into certain things because of the fact you are relatively new here is understandable. But the inquiry into aspects of this problem is something we have faced every year since 1961. So if we get a little bit concerned, when we hear this matter approached again, it is only because of this particular background. Now, in the Secretary of Defense's statement here which he just read to the committee it says: "Although we can still not see a clear need for a new strategic bomber to replace the B-52's and the FB-111's." Now, that appears that there is no real planning to proceed: Just don't know what we're going to do. This is what we have faced since 1961, that general area. This is the matter that gives us concern. So we improvise with the TFX, and we tried to put some more money in here for the AMSA, and "Well, let's hold up on that."

This is what concerns us: That each year we get stalling tactics for one reason or another. No matter how justified they might be in someone's mind, we just don't feel we can continue this forever. This is exactly what we have done now for too long a time.

WE'RE DEPRIVED OF FOLLOW-ON BOMBER

Now we think we ought to have a follow-on bomber. We think we ought to have a mix and a diversity... we have to do something, and for us to put all of our eggs into the missiles, I think this is something the committee does not want to accept, because if they do find an answer ---and you are certainly knowledgeable in that field in terms of the antiballistic missile---if they do find an answer there, we're out.

This is what concerns me certainly, and I think it is really what concerns the committee.

So as we see procrastination, a lack of affirmative decisionmaking, it alarms us... As the chairman said only the other day, if we are not going to have a follow-on bomber, it means you have to have missiles. If you are going to have missiles, it means you have only a nuclear offensive capability. So your options have been cut down there. These are the things that bother us. We are just determined to find an answer to it without having another year go by.

Whether you want to put more money into supplemental this year to satisfy the time element that bothers us at the moment I don't know. But we are terribly impatient in respect to this. Time after time, year after year this is what we face.

Mr. Hebert. Thank you, Mr. Bates. I want to share exactly with what you have said, because you put this in very sharp focus, what members of this committee are thinking. To educate or to

enlighten Dr. Foster, this committee has to go back and keep in mind our past experiences. When this committee fought so hard for the RS-70, right or wrong we fought for a follow-on bomber. This was supposed to be the follow-on bomber. Then the Secretary of Defense out of a blue sky, when he refuses to go along with the committee, announces with very dramatic zeal that we now have the A-111 (deleted) is that it? A-11. (Deleted.)

Now along comes "It is not the answer, it is not what we are talking about." Then comes the decision on that day they announced in three increments the closing of bases and the closing down of B-52 bases, followed several days later by the announcement of the phase-out of the 52's, the series up to F, which the general public doesn't understand. It just knows it is a 52 bomber. Then the explosion, which I use advisedly, by members of Congress, mostly on the Senate side, about this sudden phaseout. Two days later the Secretary of Defense announces, "Ah, those fellows talked too soon. We've got it, the FB-111." Now it develops that the FB-111 is not the answer. Now we hear that the AMSA [advanced manned strategic aircraft] is not to be the answer.

The whole picture, if you put it right across the screen, since 1961 has been resistance against the follow-on bomber which this committee has insisted on. It has been our traditional position. Every time we come to that phase of the public being informed, it is also made to be informed in an area which is not quite accurate that the answer has come up, and it hasn't come up. So now we find ourselves insisting on an answer and we find resistance.

"WE CAN'T GO ON AD INFINITUM"

I can understand your position. You have only been down there a short time in that Department, and I can really understand it, but we cannot depend upon mortals. You may drop dead, or maybe tomorrow you won't go along with Mr. McNamara and you won't have a job any more, and then somebody else will come along in the same seat and say "We need another year." We can't go on ad infinitum on this project. This is business, real business, and ugly business.

I am not trying to make a speech about it, but I am trying to reemphasize the position the committee finds itself in. The committee is determined to get the real story out to the American public. That's all. And at the same time to protect to the ultimate the maximum security of this country. That is all we are interested in: Security of the country.

The conflict boils down to this difference in interests. McNamara's primary interest is not security. A constant effort is being made to rationalize his point of view. The image has been created of a computer mind that concentrates on saving money, on getting the most bang for the dollar. The man who demonstrated over national television that he would come up with a temper tantrum when pressed, can be likened to a computer only in his lack of imagination. His relationship to the pro-red Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, of which he is a founder and important contributor, is ignored in so-called "liberal" appraisals of the man, a characteristic form of censorship and distortion by omission and selectivity. Of course, this is the most important key to his real thinking. Adam Yarmolinsky, who was a paid official of the Fund For the Republic, whose policies by the usual coincidence parallel those of Moscow, and which certainly is Marxist and Fabian socialist in its orientation, was picked to be a top man in the Pentagon, after he recommended McNamara to the Kennedys. The attempt to separate McNamara from this orientation is a Park Avenue form of image-creating.

COST-CONSCIOUSNESS A TACTIC, NOT THE OBJECTIVE

Equally indicative, too, has been his sponsorship of the curious Temple of Understanding in New York, whose emphasis appears to be in deploring so-called "narrow nationalisms." McNamara no more belongs by experience, background or orientation in the Department of Defense than does Yarmolinsky.

McNamara's main attention is reputed to be focussed upon cost-consciousness. Actually, his record is one of phenomenal waste. Indeed, one of his main tactics to avoid construction of weaponry, when no other excuse suffices, is to divert it to interminable and very costly research. Nothing in his career as Secretary of Defense is so shocking as his irrational and stubborn opposition to equipping our naval surface vessels with nuclear power instead of "fossil fuel." The original excuse presented for this suicidal policy was cost. Nuclear-powered vessels were supposed to be impossibly more expensive. This was an untruth from the start, as was disclosed by no less an authority than Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, of the

Navy's Bureau of Ships, and director of the division of naval reactors, Atomic Energy Commission. Indeed, not only is there practically total agreement, proven now by the Viet Nameese war experience, that nuclear-powered vessels are immeasurably superior to oil-driven ships, but when their costs are tabulated over a period of years, they cost no more! Yet the new naval carrier that bears the name of John F. Kennedy will be lacking nuclear power wholly because of the opposition by McNamara, inexplicable on any grounds except that of unilateral disarmament or some secret agreement with the enemy, perhaps the tacit sort outlined in such policy documents as the Phoenix Papers (see "Secret Policy in Pentagon," in March 20, 1964 issue of TACTICS). The suggestion was made in Congress that Kennedy's name be taken from the new carrier, out of shame over this inadequacy.

Admiral Rickover is quoted in the published hearing of the Joint Atomic Energy Commission entitled "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program," dated January 26, 1966, as declaring: "The Navy has come to this conclusion, sir, for nuclear surface warships: that over the life of the ship, there is probably not much difference in cost between nuclear and conventional propulsion when all factors are considered."

In other words, on such matters, cost is what is known as a cover story, so far as being the reason behind McNamara's unexplainable opposition to such advanced weaponry. His control of the Defense Department is characterized by the unprecedented failure to allow a single new weapons system of any sort to be devised for the American military and added to our arsenal. This is disarmament in action.

MAJOR NEWS STORY SIMPLY IGNORED BY PRESS

Admiral Rickover was a great hero to the so-called "liberal" press some years back when he was on the way up the ladder, and could be presented as a victim of bias. His crusade on behalf of nuclear-powered submarines was a big story then. The same press took McNamara to its heart from the start. He was a symbol of Jack the Giant Killer in the Pentagon, shooting generals and admirals down to size. One rule concerning news coverage is that the press is always on the lookout for controversy. One of the major controversies of the past year is that between Rickover and McNamara over the issue of nuclear-powered war vessels, the former fighting for them and the latter fighting to keep them from being built. One would expect that the press would go to town on this story, playing it up for all it's worth! Let the reader of this article ask himself whether he has read anything about this controversy in the dispatches from Washington or in the columns written by the stable of "liberal" writers. Editors should ask their Washington bureaus and the two major news syndicates why they have been sitting on this story. Readers should ask editors the same question.

Admiral Rickover told the joint committee (page 5):

...we have made quite a bit of progress in technology even though we have not been able to get approval to build many ships. Whatever progress in core design we have made has been by building and testing prototypes of these new cores, not by merely making paper studies. You cannot continue to make advances in any technical field by merely conducting studies. You have to build and operate reactors to advance the technology because only when you start building do you learn what your problems are, and solve them.

I would like to make the point that an issue can be studied forever and ever and you won't get any more out of it. You wind up regurgitating the same things over and over again---with no real progress. If you really want to make progress, it is necessary to start working on hardware. Then you will find out what the problems are and how to correct them or improve the design.

If important mistakes are not recognized and corrected, we may well end up with our country weakened to the point that we could not win a war if it should occur. As a case in point, consider the hiatus in building nuclear-powered surface warships. We have the technology today to build a powerful nuclear-powered naval fleet unequaled in history. But if we are confined to continuing to make paper studies rather than building ships, we may end up when a war comes with many studies and no ships.

Where are the N. Y. Times reporters and editors who went to town on the pacifist hoax that "experts on China urge U. S. to seek a Peking accord," as its headline read on March 21? (See TACTICS of April 20, 1966.) Any cub reporter should be able to recognize the headline, and the responsibility to write it: "Rickover Warns Nuclear Ship Lag Can Cause U. S. Defeat." This is legitimate news. The headline appeared nowhere, because the Washington news syndicates and the Washington bureaus failed to report this news, or to put it on the wires. Surely the time has come to tackle this news management scandal.

A devastating attack upon McNamara's figures was made by Rickover, also unreported by the press:

I believe you are aware that I do not favor cost-effectiveness studies as much as some do. Wars have always stubbornly refused to go as planned. It was the elder Moltke who said "no plan survives contact with the enemy." I think it would be a good idea to go back and see how correct cost-effectiveness studies have proved to be in light of the present war. How does cost-effectiveness stand up under war conditions? This is a subject I have discussed with this committee many times. To put it simply, you either make studies or you build ships.

.... These studies are conducted under a set of rules which may not be realistic when actually put to the test... The cost-effectiveness concept is good for peacetime; but the military effectiveness is what must be paramount in planning for wartime.

Congressman Craig Hosmer (R-Calif.) referred to \$20,000,000 allotted by Congress on nuclear propulsion. Rickover repeated the old story:

Admiral Rickover. We have not been given the money, sir. We have requisitions for the items all drawn up. Once Congress appropriated this money I assumed we would get it. We are ready to place contracts for the items but the money is not forthcoming.

"JUST STALL IT OFF INDEFINITELY"

Admiral Rickover declared that "wherever possible it should be the policy to use nuclear power rather than conventional power in surface ships," whereupon Congressman Bates pointed out that this was the intent of Congress in appropriating the money. "Now we want to know why it has not been used," he said. No needed data was lacking, Rickover declared. This colloquy followed:

Mr. Leighton [David T., associate director for surface ships, with division of naval reactors, A. E. C.]. It is a matter of opinion as to what you need to have to make a judgment, sir.

Representative Hosmer. Or whether you want to make a judgment or just stall it off indefinitely; is that correct? You don't need to answer that.

Admiral Rickover. Some of the studies submitted by the Navy are objected to, but reasons for the objections are not given. The people are simply told to make up another study.... In the cost-effectiveness studies performed by the analysts, they compute numerical values, for the effectiveness of nuclear power. However, before they make the calculation, they make certain simplifying assumptions in order to be able to do the arithmetic. These assumptions just happen to eliminate from consideration the principal military reasons for wanting nuclear power in the first place.... the history of war is replete with examples of major military defeats that were brought about by the inability of military forces to maintain a supply of propulsion fuel to the forces in combat.

HOW PLANS FOR NUCLEAR CARRIER WERE SABOTAGED

Representative Hosmer. Is the Kennedy hull so far along that it is set now for conventional power?

Admiral Rickover. Yes, sir, it is too late to change that ship to nuclear propulsion. There was time to change her to nuclear power when the Joint Committee raised the issue in 1963, but we were not allowed to change it. Instead we were asked to make studies, and these studies were kept going long enough so that by the time the studies were complete it was too late.... I am sure President Kennedy would rather have had his name attached to a modern nuclear carrier than to a conventional carrier.

McNamara on March 7, 1966, as reported in the foreward to the joint committee hearing, finally gave way and asked appropriation for a nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier. In published hearings entitled, "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," dated February and March, 1966, McNamara's statement to this effect was met by this reaction from Senator Clinton P. Anderson (D-Ill.):

I am sure it is not applicable but there used to be a hymn which read, "And while the lamp holds out to burn, the vilest sinner may return."

Actually, he had no alternative. The nuclear carrier Enterprise and the nuclear frigate Bainbridge were proving their overwhelming superiority under war pressure in the Viet Nam theater of conflict. McNamara had asked for no construction of any major fleet escorts, conventional or nuclear, since 1964. Now he has asked for two conventionally powered guided missile destroyers. The joint committee recommended that Congress require that these two be nuclear-powered. More wasted years must drag on in the interval.